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Colombo: Merit Regulation via the Suitability Rules

MERIT REGULATION VIA THE SUITABILITY RULES*
RonaldJ.Colombo**
INTRODUCTION
The philosophy underpinning federal securities regulation in the United States is one
of disclosure. This has been the case since the inception of federal securities regulation in
1933,1 and continues to be the case with Congress's most recent enactments on the subject,
contained in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.2
In the wake of the financial industry's collapse in 2008, and the recession it helped
spark, some have questioned whether this paradigm remains advisable. They have suggested
the introduction of merit regulation into the U.S. securities law regime, whereby the
government would not merely mandate certain issuer disclosures, but would also prevent the
offering of securities deemed too risky.4 Although not revolutionary (as several American
states, and nations such as China, have a merit component to their securities laws), the
concept of merit regulation is indeed largely alien to the scheme of U.S. federal securities
regulation.5 As such, it would be a transformative development.
There is, however, a far more modest way of approximating the same result. And it
builds upon the existing U.S. regulatory infrastructure: suitability rules. Via enhancements to
the suitability rules, policymakers can achieve much of what merit regulation promises,
without the significant, accompanying drawbacks. Properly enhanced, such rules could
provide a system that safeguards investors from unsuitably risky investments on a case-bycase basis, thereby depriving neither corporations, nor investors, of mutually beneficial
opportunities that might be fully appropriate for them despite their inappropriateness for
others. It could also furnish an additional tool by which authorities could regulate systemic
risk.
Due to the drawbacks of merit regulation, numerous advanced economies, amongst
them the UK, Australia, and Hong Kong, have all adopted disclosure-based regulation.6
Utilizing suitability rules could theoretically be easily translated to these countries just as well
as they would to the US.
Article
first published
in 2 WORLD
ECON.
REV. 54 (2013),
available at
http://wer.worldeconomicsassociation.orglarticle/view/57.
**Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I thank my colleague J. Scott
Colesanti for his helpful assistance with this project. I also thank the World Economics Association for
allowing me to include an earlier draft of this paper in its 2012 Conference "Rethinking Financial Markets."
' Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 171(b)(4), 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
*

3 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: Securities Regulation Scholarship and

Teaching in the Global Financial Crisis, 5 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 59, 67 (2010).
4 See idat64 n. 26.

5 Robin Hui Huang, The Regulationof Securities Offerings in China: Reconsidering the Merit Review Element
in Light of the Global Financial Crisis, 41 HONG KONG L. J. 261 (2011); Jennifer J. Johnson, Private
Placements:A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151,156-57 (2010).
6

See Hui Huang, supra note 5, at 272.
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Like Caesar's Gaul, this Article is divided into three parts. Part I will describe the
disclosure-based federal securities regulatory regime that prevails in the United States today.
It will highlight the limitations of this regime, as underscored by merit-regulation proponents
seeking its reform. Part ii will describe merit regulation, both in theory and in practice. It too
will end with an articulation of the drawbacks associated with such an approach. Part III will
describe the "suitability rules" component of U.S. securities law, as they are currently
formulated. Part III will also demonstrate how the suitability rules can be utilized to
essentially achieve the desideratum of merit regulation without the costs associated therewith.
1.The Disclosure Based Regime of U.S. Federal Securities Regulation
Prior to 1933, securities regulation in the United States was largely a matter of state
concern - much like corporate law.7 As will be discussed in Part II, state securities regulation
(commonly referred to as the "blue sky laws") followed primarily a merit-based approach.8
Pursuant to this approach, "securities proposed to be sold in a state [must] be submitted to an
administrative agency for review as to their 'merit' or intrinsic worth." 9 Despite a generation
of experience with such an approach,10 the federal regulation of securities took a decidedly
different tack.11 Instead of following the states' merit-based approach, the U.S. 1Congress
2
adopted a disclosure-based regime of securities regulation when it moved into action.
Prompting federal action was the stock market crash of 1929, and the practices
13
leading up to it (especially as they came to light in subsequent investigations and inquiries).
And it is easy to see why. Quantitatively, the losses were staggering. "The aggregate value
of all stocks listed on the NYSE on September 1, 1929, was $89 billion.... In 1932, the
aggregate figure was down to $15 billion. 1 4 Qualitatively, the cover was ripped off of
corporate practices that were roundly condemned as unscrupulous and immoral.15 Among
other things, prior to the crash, a nation hungry for speculative securities was willingly fed by
promoters whose practices ranged from hype and puffery to downright misrepresentation. 16
"[I]nvestors, who had been given little information about the securities they had invested in,
were allured by
promises of easy wealth and became victims of widespread fraud and
17
manipulation.,
Congress's initial response was the 1933 Securities Act.18 Pursuant to the 1933 Act,
an issuer of securities is required to make certain, specific public disclosures before selling its

7 See 1 FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES § 1 (1995).
' See infra Part Il.
9 Jonathan R.Macey & Geoffrey P.Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L.REv. 347, 348 (1991).
10See id.
" See LouIs LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN,

& TROY

PAREDES, I FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 45-46,

5th ed. (2011).
12See id.
1 See Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold?, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 91, 119-120 (2007).
14 LOSS ET AL., supranote 11, at 45.
15 See Colombo, supranote 13, at 119-121.
16 See Macey & Miller, supranote 9, at 355.
17 Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive
Approach to SecuritiesRegulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 139, 144 (Winter 2006).
18See LOSS ET AL., supranote 111, at 45-46.
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securities.19 These disclosures are made to the SEC via a publicly available registration
statement - and summarized in a prospectus to be distributed to prospective investors before
or at the time of their securities purchase. 20 To buttress the credibility of these disclosures,
strict anti-fraud rules are also contained in the 1933 Act, making it far easier (in many cases)
for a defrauded
investor to recover from an unscrupulous issuer than had been the case under
21
state law.
The 1933 Act was followed up by the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which added
to the volume of required regulatory disclosures.22 Under the 1934 Exchange Act, the issuer
of a publicly traded security is obliged to issue periodic reports well after an offering of
securities: annual
reports, quarterly reports, and periodic reports triggered by certain specified
23
occurrences.
Additional securities legislation flowed out of Congress throughout the 1930s, but
this legislation was more targeted in its focus, as can be gleaned from the names of the acts in
question: the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.24 Further, in
these acts, Congress demonstrated a greater willingness to engage in aggressively substantive
lawmaking - moving beyond simply disclosure and antifraud rules. 25 But, to the extent that
this is so, these acts, and their specialized applicability, represent the proverbial exceptions
that prove the rule: the overall approach to the regulation of securities issuance and trading in
the United States is set forth in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which are firmly disclosure-based
pieces of legislation.
A driving force behind the federal approach was Louis D. Brandeis, who famously
remarked that "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman. 26 In other words, enhanced disclosure would lead to better securities
industry
27
practices, by making unsavory practices more difficult to conceal or get away with.
Other factors were at work as well, however. The British experience with securities
regulation, with which Congress was also familiar, was disclosure based, giving Congress
something other than the blue-sky model to consider.28 Then there was the prospect of federal
merit regulation in practice: would not an enormous and potentially unworkable new
apparatus be required to implement such a regime? 29 Further, Congress was attempting to
thread the needle and devise a regulatory regime that would simultaneously protect investors

"9

See id. at 57.

See id.
See id. at 47.
22 See id.
at 58.
23 See id. at 58-59.
24 See id. at 60-74.
25 See id. at 60-61.
26 Id. at 46.
27 See Ripken, supra note 17, at 151.
28 See Charles H.B. Braisted, State Registration of Securities: An Anachronism No Longer Viable, 78 WASH.
U. L.Q. 401,405 (2000).
29 See id.
William 0. Douglas, who favored a merit-based approach, was apparently fully aware of what it
would entail yet not dissuaded: he acknowledged that it would require a "government agency ... 'a thousand
fold more complex than the ...
Interstate Commerce Commission.'" See Loss ET AL., supra note 11, at 48.
20
21
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without impeding corporate access to the capital markets. 30 It found a disclosure-based
approach best suited to this delicate balancing act.31 Congress also feared the signaling effect
that federal merit regulation might bring about, as it wanted to "avoid the implicit approval
by
32
the federal government of the merits of any securities offered for sale to the public."
Finally, there was the economic argument that the provision of adequate information
via disclosure would lead to increased "transparency and efficiency in the securities
markets. 33 This, in turn, produces "increased price stability and diminished market
volatility. 34 Although disclosure may not be a panacea, it was seen as something coming
very close to one.
In sum, then, the "main goal of the securities laws [was] to provide sufficient
disclosure to enable investors to make informed decisions about the securities they buy and
sell. 35
Over time, policymakers have remained fairly faithful to this mission. The two
most recent and comprehensive reforms of the securities laws, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
200236 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 201037 attest
to this. Although each contains an aggressive dose of substantive regulatory reform, each
also generally carries on the tradition of regulating through disclosure. Sarbanes-Oxley, for
example, requires public companies to disclose whether they have at least one "financial
expert" on their board of directors - but does not actually require the presence of one.38
Dodd-Frank directed the SEC to promulgate rules requiring public companies to disclose their
efforts to avoid the purchase of "conflict minerals" - without prohibiting the actual purchase
thereof.39 Indeed, it has been observed that "[t]here is a recurrent theme throughout [the
federal securities laws] of disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure., 40 As
Susannah Kim Ripken observed:
The disclosure of material information is said to do everything from
producing more transparent and efficient markets, to making corporate

30
31

See Braisted, supranote 28, at 405.
Id.("Congress chose the disclosure philosophy as the best protection for public investors because it allowed

each investor to make his or her own investment decision based on full information, without imposing an
unreasonable restraint on legitimate business finance.") James Cox observes that "there is a clear inconsistency
between professing obeisance to capitalism and allowing civil servants to dictate what ventures may raise funds
in capital markets." James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in the U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
1200, 1200 (1999). Although there is truth in this, I question whether the New Deal policymakers behind the
1933 and 1934 Acts can be said to have professed "obeisance to capitalism."
32 Braisted, supranote 28, at 405.
" Ripken, supra note 17, at 153.
34 See id. at 154.
31 See id. at 144.
36 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
17 Dodd-Frank, supra note 2.
38 See Ripken, supra note 17, at 144.
'9Sarah A. Altschuller, Amy K. Lehr, & Andrew J. Orsmond, CorporateSocial Responsibility, 45 INT'L LAW.
179, 183-84 (2011). "'Conflict minerals' include tantalum (coltan), cassiterite (tin), wolramite (tungsten) and
gold. The sale of conflict minerals, it is believed, helps armed groups fund the purchase of weapons and allows
them to continue hostilities in the [Congo]." Id.
40 Ripken, supra note 17, at 145 (alteration in original).
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executives behave more honestly and diligently, to decreasing investor
risks and protecting the public interest.
In the wake of continued financial crises since the Great Depression (and especially
in the wake of the 2007-2009 recession), some have questioned the effectiveness of the
American disclosure-based system of securities regulation. 41 They echo arguments raised
long ago by William 0. Douglas, expressed in the 1930s, that a disclosure-based would be
simply too simplistic for the complex world of modem finance:
The whole business [that is, the 1933 and 1934 acts] is essentially a
"nineteenth-century piece of legislation" that unrealistically envisages a
return to "Main Street business." This explains, among other things, the
"great reliance placed on truth about securities, as if the truth cold be told
to people who could understand it - a supposition that might be justified if
little units of business were seeking funds and people were buying shares
with the modicum of intelligence with which they are supposed to buy
wearing apparel or horses." We cannot "turn back the clock" to simpler
says, said Douglas. We must perfect a plan for control of our present
forms of organization so as to harness the "instruments of productions not
only for the ancient purpose of profit but also for the more solely evolving
service in the sense of the public good." ... "The control needed is one
which would combine regulation by industry with supervision by
government." ... Ultimately, there must be some form of control over
access to the capital market, Douglas believed.42
More specifically, the critiques of the U.S. disclosure-based system of securities
regulation can be divided into two categories: those criticizing the system from the standpoint
of investor protection, and those criticizing the system from the standpoint of systemic risk.
With regard to the question of investor protection, the critics of the disclosure
approach mistrust the "prudence of investors. 43 They question whether investors, even if
armed with all necessary and relevant information, will make investment decisions that are
sound and reasonable." Indeed, they question whether investors will even be able to capably
understand the information disclosed to them.45 In short, these critics seek to protect investors
from themselves. Their perspective is unquestionably a paternalistic one, but one also one
rooted in historical experience. 46 "Exhibit A" in support of this position has been the
financial crisis of 2008. 47
41

See id.
at 139-148.

LOSSET AL., supranote 11, at 48.
43 Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for Federal Merit
42

Review, 44 U.RICH. L.REV. 647, 649 (January 2010).
681.
41 See id.
46 See id.
at 648.
47 See id. The degree to which the financial crisis of 2008 serves to condemn the U.S. disclosure-based system
of securities regulation is an interesting question - and one that is a bit beyond the scope of the this Article. On
the one hand, most of the financial instruments and transactions at the heart of the crisis fell outside of the
disclosure rules. See id.
at 683. Due, in large part, to the sophistication of the actors in question, much of the
44 See id. at
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The critique also draws support from the observation that financial instruments have
grown increasingly (and incredibly) complicated." Indeed, it has been stated that "some
structures are getting so complex that they are incomprehensible.""41 This calls into question
the utility of disclosure as a means of investor protection.50
The second line of attack concerns systemic risk. Simply put, the capital markets
are deemed simply too vital and complicated to be left, fundamentally, in private hands. 51 As
per Douglas, "a more thoroughgoing and comprehensive control" is needed.52 The capital
markets "should be lodged 'in the hands not only of the new self-disciplined business groups
but also in the hands of government agencies whose function would be to articulate the public
interest with the profit motive."' 53 This concern is not so much about protecting investors
from themselves, but about protecting everyone from those who would invest imprudently. It
is predicated upon the notion that an individual's (or, more likely, an institution's) poor
investment decisions can impose negative externalities upon others. Once again, "Exhibit A"
in support of this contention is the financial crisis of 2008.54 The crisis demonstrates vividly
how the disclosure approach to regulation leaves each of us exposed to harm and fallout
resulting from the poor investment choices of others.55
11. Merit Regulation
As already indicated, when the United States enacted a regime of federal securities
regulation, the road not taken was that of merit regulation.5 6 "Merit regulation" is what
generally characterized the state regulation of securities at the time of the federal securities
laws' promulgation.57 Indeed, merit regulation continues to characterize much of the state
regulation of securities today - an
area of regulation persists to the degree that it has not been
58
preempted by federal legislation.

activity that precipitated the crisis was exempt from the myriad rules and regulation requiring disclosure. See
id. This suggests that, if anything, the crisis provides a more trenchant indictment of the exemptions from the
disclosure regime - rather than an indictment of the disclosure regime itself. That said, the actors involved
were typically quite sophisticated - and either had access to (or could have likely obtained) whatever
information would have been provided to them had the transactions not been exempt from the disclosure
requirements. Thus, it is unlikely that things would have been significantly different had these transactions
been fully registered and accompanied by the disclosures required of non-exempt transactions. See id.
48

See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L.

REV. 1, 12 (2004).
49 Id.
50 See id.
5' See Morrissey, supranote 43, at 681.
52

id.

53 id.
14

See id. at 683.

5 See id.
56

See supranotes 3-9; see also Morrissey, supra note 43, at 647.

57 See RICHARD A. BOOTH,FINANCING THE CORPORATION §9.13 (2012).

See id But see Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors of Burden on
Commerce? 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 105 (1987) (Not all state securities legislation is truly "merit regulation"
58

-some take a different approach.)
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The American experience with merit regulation (and, moreover, with securities
regulation generally) was commenced in the early part of the twentieth century.5 9 Prior to that
time, securities transactions were not subject to any specialized body of law or regulation.60
In 1911 Kansas enacted the first law in America regulating the sale of securities - and by the
Great Depression, every state had followed suit. 6 1 The Kansas law, like many, was enacted
in response to widespread securities fraud in that state.62 As a result, these state securities
laws were soon given the name "blue sky laws," because they were passed to combat the
efforts of securities fraudsters to sell building lots in the blue sky to gullible investors.63
As the moniker "merit regulation" suggests, this approach to securities regulation
entails "review by a state securities commissioner (or administrator) to determine whether the
quality of a given issue of securities was [or is] adequate for sale in that state., 64 As one
commentator put it: "Merit regulation seeks to foster fairness, to regulate the riskiness of
investments offered, to prevent fraud, and generally to increase investor confidence., 65 Of
course, the same can be said (and is said) of disclosure-based regulation. The difference
being is that the disclosure approach allows investors and the market to determine whether a
given offering is fair or excessively risky, whereas it is a government official who makes that
determination in merit regulation.
Merit-regulation does not purport to screen for only the highest-quality investment
options - quite the contrary, it endeavors merely to "assure that all securities will be of at
least minimum quality. 66 That is, the securities must simply be found fit for sale (and
purchase) - they may still be generally undesirable for a host of reasons. The standard
employed in determining the fitness of a security is ordinarily that the terms of the securities
offering be "fair, just and equitable. 67 Although the factors consulted in making this
determination vary somewhat from state to state, a universally important factor is an
evaluation of the portion of proceeds going to the issuer versus the portion going to
underwriters.68 Other factors consulted include "options and warrants to be issued in
connection with the offering, cheap stock, the extent of the existing capitalization of the
issuer, the promoters' investment, dilution, the offering price, voting rights, loans to
promoters and offering expenses generally. 69 In short, the merit regulator is (in many states)
empowered to "act[] as a negotiator in getting a better deal for investors." 70 The merit

59 See BOOTH, supranote 57, at §9.2.

See Morrissey, supranote 43, at 677-78.
See id.
62 See BOOTH, supra note 57, at §9.2.
63 Id. See also JAMES E. BALLOWE, JR. &
PLI/CoRp 433, 435 (1993).
60
61

64 BOOTH,

PENELOPE Y. F. THAM, STATE BLUE SKY REGULATION, 816

supranote 57, at §9.2.

65 id.
66 id.
67

Id at §9.2.

68 See id. "As a general rule, commissions in excess of 15 percent will not pass muster in a merit regulation

state." Id.
69 Idat §9.13; see also BALLOWE & THAM, supranote 63, at 443-46.

70Karmel, supra note 58, at 116.
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regulator polices the transaction to protect investors from offerings that are unscrupulous,
unfair, or simply too risky.71
Additionally, merit regulators have assumed the power to "directly intervene to
require changes in the internal structure of a securities issuer, the relations among insiders and
outsiders, and the terms of the offering." 72 As such, the merit regular has broad authority to
demand changes to a corporation or its proposed offering before allowing a securities offering
to proceed.

Further still, most merit-regulation jurisdictions impose licensing requirements on
securities broker-dealers, and ban offerings by issuers who officers have run afoul the law.73
As with the disclosure regime, merit regulation has its detractors. The screening of
proposed securities offerings by government officials "clearly imposes burdens on capital
formation." 74 Not only must securities issuers convince the capital markets of their
offering's worthiness, but they have the added hurdle (and costs) of having to convince a
regulator as well. With that hurdle comes the risk of regulator error: the prospect that a
quality offering will be wrongfully rejected. 75 The specter of corruption and bias in the
process must also be considered.76
The paternalistic philosophy of merit regulation is also challenged.77 Even if such
paternalism could have at one time been justified, it cannot be so today (so goes the
argument).78 For merit regulation arrived on the scene during the era of the individual
investor, but today is the era of the institutional and professional investor. 79 Today's investors
(many of them at least) may very well be more sophisticated than the regulators themselves.
It seems like folly, therefore, to allow a regulator to dictate what offerings an investor can or
cannot partake in from some consumer-protection rationale focused on fairness and

appropriate risk.80
Standing in obvious response to the anti-paternalism argument is the simple fact that
even large, sophisticated, institutional investors made a series of tremendously bad
investments in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis.81 But in an important respect, this
criticism misses the mark. The critics of merit regulation's paternalism do not claim that the

71 See BALLOWE & T-AM, supra note 63, at 437.

72 Karmel, supranote 58, at 116.
73 See BALLOWE & THAM, supra note 63, at 440-42.
74 Karmel, supra note 58, at 106. But see Manning Gilbert Warren III, Legitimacy in the Securities Industry:
The Role of Merit Regulation, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 129, 140 (1987) ("The argument that capital formation is
impeded by state securities regulation, and, more particularly, merit regulation is ... highly suspect.").
75 But see Jay T. Brandi, The Silver Lining in Blue Sky Laws: The Effect of Merit Regulation on Common Stock
Returns and Market Efficiency, 12 J. CORP. L. 713, 734 (1987) (finding that "the criticism regarding market
inefficiency due to merit restrictions may be unwarranted").
76 On a related note, corruption in the traditional process of corporate chartering (which, like the merit
regulation of securities, was done on a company-by-company basis) is what led, in part, to the promulgation of
statutes of general incorporation (depriving state regulators of discretion in the granting or denial of corporate
charters). Gregory A. Mark, The CourtAnd The Corporation:Jurisprudence,Localism, And Federalism, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 403,414 (1997).
77 BALLOWE & THAM, supra note 63, at 448-49.

7 See id. at 448-49.
79 See id.

'o See id.
81 Morrissey, supra note 43, at 681.
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twenty-first century investor is infallible. Rather, these critics query whether a government
regulator would be any less fallible.82 The point is a good one, and not to be dismissed
lightly. There is no reason to believe that the best-and-the-brightest financial experts are
inevitably drawn to Washington, D.C. In fact, given the substantial draw of lucrative private
sector salaries, it is difficult to see why this would be the case. At best, therefore, one could
hope that government regulators are on par with those whom they regulate in terms of
expertise and ability.
There is, however, at least one important factor that may help level the playing field
- or, perhaps, give the government's regulators an advantage: access to information. Quality
information is, arguably, one of the most precious commodities in our modem world - and
especially so within the financial services industry and the capital markets. Armed with the
new powers and tools by Dodd-Frank Act,83 today's regulators undoubtedly have greater
access to critical information than their counterparts in private industry. Whereas a top flight
private analyst has access to abundant publicly-available information, a government regulator
has access to all that and much more: to nonpublic information procured via subpoena and
other means.
Another line of criticism against merit regulation is that it failed to prevent the crisis
of 1929.84 After all, by the time of the crisis, most states had adopted some form of merit
regulation.85 However, the crisis of 1929 was national in scope, and as such arguably beyond
the realistic reach of state regulators to prevent or contain.86
Perhaps the most forceful critique of merit regulation - on a federal level, at least is its simple unworkability. It is difficult to imagine how the SEC, or any federal agency,
could effectively provide a merit review of each and every proposed securities offering. An
enormous increase in staffing and resources would be required - and even that fails to
guarantee whether sufficient expertise would be available to adequately analyze the volume
of offerings expeditiously enough.
III. Effectuating Merit Regulation via the Suitability Rules
A.

The Suitability Rules

The "suitability rules" require that a broker, when recommending a securities
transaction to a customer, does so based upon the informed belief that the transaction is
"suitable" for the customer.87 This requirement is not imposed by the federal securities laws,

82

See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J.CORP. L. 553,

565-67 (1985); Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUs. LAW. 785,
853 (1986).
83 Dodd-Frank, supra note 2; see So-Yeon Lee, FinancialStability Oversight Council, 30 REv. BANKING &
FIN. L. 528, 534-35 (Spring 2011).
84 Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of
FederalSecuritiesRegulation, 93 ICH. L. REv. 649, 673 (February 1995).
85 See supra text accompanying note 58.
86 BALLOWE & THAM, supra note 63, at 437; Thomas E.Geyer, Viewing the Columbus Skyline: Incorporating
Federal Law into the Anti-Fraud Standard of the Ohio Securities Act, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 301, 305-06 (Winter
1997).
87 See I CLTFFORD E. KIRSCH, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 11:1.1 (2D ED. 2012).
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but rather by the securities exchanges themselves.88 For brokers of the New York Stock
Exchange, the relevant rule is FINRA Rule 2111.89 Although not absolutely identical, the
suitability rules adopted by all other securities exchanges in the United States substantially
follow FINRA Rule 2111.90
Rule 2111 reads, in its entirety, as follows:
(a) A member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a
security or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information
obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated
person to ascertain the customer's investment profile. A customer's
investment profile includes, but is not limited to, the customer's age, other
investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity
needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the customer may disclose
to the member or associated person in connection with such
recommendation.
(b) A member or associated person fulfills the customer-specific suitability
obligation for an institutional account, as defined in Rule 4512(c), if (1) the
member or associated person has a reasonable basis to believe that the
institutional customer is capable of evaluating investment risks
independently, both in general and with regard to particular transactions
and investment strategies involving a security or securities and (2) the
institutional customer affirmatively indicates that it is exercising
independent judgment in evaluating the member's or associated person's
recommendations. Where an institutional customer has delegated
decisionmaking authority to an agent, such as an investment adviser or a
bank trust department, these factors shall be applied to the agent. 91

-

Rule 2111 is frequently, and advisably, read in conjunction with FINRA Rule 2090
FINRA's "know your customer" rule.92 This short rule reads, in its entirety, as follows:

88 See id. That said, courts have held that a violation of the suitability rules can also constitute a violation or

Rule lOb-5, the anti-fraud provision promulgated by the SEC under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. See id
'9 See FINRA Rule 2111 (available at
http://fmra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&recordid
=13390&elementid--9859&highlight--2 11#r13390).
90See Jennifer A. Frederick, Not Just For Widows & Orphans Anymore: The Inadequacy Of The Current
Suitability Rules For The Derivatives Market, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 97, 110 n.79 (October 1995). It should be
noted that if a broker is primarily in the business of rendering investment advice, then the broker would instead
be regulated by the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION, 5 Law Sec. Reg. § 14.16[1] (6th ed. 2013).
9' See FINRA Rule 2111 (availableat http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid = 2403&record _

I d=13390&element_id--9859&highlight-21 11#r13390).
92

See KIRSCH, supranote 87, at § 11:1.1.
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Every member shall use reasonable diligence, in regard to the opening and
maintenance of every account, to know (and retain) the essential facts concerning every
customer and concerning the authority of each person acting on behalf of such customer. 93
Thus, suitability requires a broker to comprehend his or her client's financial
situation ("investment profile") via the use of "reasonable diligence." Further, the broker
must restrict his or her investment suggestions to those that are "suitable" to the client in light
of the client's situation. Observe that what may or may not be suitable is not wholly
determined by the client's own wishes, but rather takes into account certain objective factors
("the customer's age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance")
that go well beyond a client's expressions of interest or desire. The broker is, therefore,
expected to exercise a large degree of independent, professional judgment in determining
whether to recommend a specific investment as suitable.
Although it is not clear from the Rule's text itself, the broker must (of course) also
be well-versed in the security, and/or the security transaction, that he or she is
recommending. 94
Not surprisingly, a client's wealth and income are not dispositive factors. FINRA
has held that a dealer "may not rely exclusively on the client's status as an accredited investor
under Regulation D of the Securities Act for satisfying suitability obligations," because this
status alone does not adequately inform the entire suitability analysis. 95 Further, the
suitability requirement does not automatically vanish when a broker's client happens to be an
institutional investor. As Rule 2111(b) explains, even in this situation the broker has
important suitability obligations. More specifically, the broker must be satisfied that the
institutional investor is capable of adequately evaluating the transaction in question, and the
institutional investor must affirmative declare that it is indeed exercising independent
judgment with regard to the transaction. (If the institutional investor is acting through an
investment advisor, or the equivalent, then those factors are applied to that advisor. 96 )
B.

The Federalizationof Suitability to Achieve Merit Regulation

The suitability rules are well-positioned to serve as a means by which the benefits of
merit regulation can, to a significant degree, be realized. Moreover, this realization can occur
without the more serious drawbacks that often accompany merit-based regulation, as
addressed previously. 97
As currently formulated, suitability rules (such as FINRA Rule 2111) vest a
tremendous degree of discretion in the hands of brokers. But this need not be the case. The
SEC could adopt guidance and mandates that would help brokers define certain investments

93 See FINRA Rule 2090 (availableat http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display .html ?rbid =2403&
record id=13389&element id=9858&highlight=2090#rl 3389).
94 See HAZEN, supra note 90.
9' KIRSCH, supra note 87, at §11:1.3.
96

See id.

97 See supranotes 74-86.
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as simply "suitable" or "unsuitable" for certain classes of investors defined by regulation. 98
In other words, the SEC could federalize the concept of suitability.
In so doing, the SEC would not be mandating regulatory approval for each and
every proposed securities offering (along the lines of typical blue-sky merit regulation).
Instead, the SEC would simply be promulgating broad guidelines that brokers would need to
incorporate into their suitability analysis. From purely quantitative metrics such as earningsto-price ratios, to more qualitative ones such as the issuer's particular industry, the SEC could
promulgate standards against which a particular security's level of risk could be assessed.
Based upon these standards, securities could be classified, by brokers, into particular "riskbearing" categories themselves defined by the SEC. Thus, a security could be labeled "high
risk" if, upon an examination of its particular characteristics, including those set forth as
relevant by the SEC, the security possesses a great deal of investment risk.
Of course, brokers, advisors, and industry analysts already do this, and one might
question the utility of the SEC's guidelines, deeming then duplicative. But for at least two
inter-related reasons, this is not the case.
First, in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC has broader access to nonpublic information than ever before.99 Via use of the powers contained in the Act, the federal
government can acquire information deemed critical to the nation's economic health, and
share that information with agencies (such as the SEC) situated to act upon it. Thus, in
promulgating its standards regarding an investment security's risk, the SEC could draw upon
this information, and provide guidance that could not otherwise be replicated by private
industry professionals. Thus, the risk-bearing classification would be based upon standards
that are derived, in part, from important nonpublic information.
Second, the SEC's guidelines would reflect public policy determinations, whereas
wholly private risk assessments ordinarily do not. As will be fleshed out momentarily below,
depending upon how the risk standards are calibrated, the SEC's guidelines could effectively
place certain securities off-limits for certain groups of investors. Moreover, the SEC's
guidelines may consciously do this to implement a policy of keeping particular types of
securities out of the hands of certain types of investors. 100
Which brings us to the second prong of the approach: a classification of investors
based upon particular, relevant characteristics. The SEC could promulgate an investor
classification schema, pursuant to which investors could be placed into particular categories

98 This would not be entirely unprecedented, as the SEC has adopted its own suitability rule with regard to the

trading of "penny stock[s]." See Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, 17 C.F.R.
240.15g-9(a) (2005).
99See Dodd-Frank, supra note 2; see also Lee, supranote 83.
'0 It should be noted that the SEC could take a more aggressive approach toward this same end. Instead of
simply promulgating guidelines and standards, the SEC could take the next step and actually categorize each
securities offering itself in accordance with these guidelines and standards. That is, the SEC could classify
each offered security into a pre-established risk category, and make such classification binding upon the
securities industry. This would come very close to implementing a federal blue-sky approach. However, there
would be at least one significant distinction. Unlike typical blue-sky regulation, the SEC would not be
authorized to block the underwriting of a securities offering based upon its substantive risk. Instead, the SEC
would be limited to simply assigning the offering a risk classification which, as explained more fully below,
would be cross-referenced with an investor's status and situation to determine the security's suitability. Such
an aggressive approach would, however, require a tremendous amount of resources, and as such undermine one
of the major benefits of the proposal over existing versions of blue-sky regulation, as discussed below.
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based upon their degree to tolerate and/or withstand risk. This too, is already done by brokers
and other securities professionals, which once again begs the question: where is the value
added by the SEC's roll-out of such a classification?
Unlike the classifications employed in the private market, the SEC's classification
system need not be a simple exercise in lining up groups of investors, in order, between the
poles "non-wealthy" and "wealthy" (with the assumption that the more wealthy the investor,
generally speaking, the greater his, her, or its ability to withstand risk). Instead, the SEC's
classification schema could (and should) take into account the principles embodied in the
Dodd-Frank Act (and banking regulation in general) - namely, that certain entities are too
systemically important to assume excessive levels of risk. Thus, the investor classification
scheme should take into account the fact that certain investors, despite a high level of
sophistication, and a substantial degree of wealth, are nevertheless placed into a lower-risktolerance classification on account of their systemic importance.
Finally, the SEC would furnish a "suitability matrix," which would tie these two
variables together (a security's "risk bearing" classification, and an investor's "risk tolerance"
classification). This matrix would identify which securities were suitable for which investors.
The matrix would not be a simple matching of "high risk" bearing securities with
"high risk" tolerant investors, and so forth. Rather, it envisions a more complicated
classification scheme, in which an investor's "risk tolerance" and a securities "risk bearing"
classifications are not simple, one-dimensional characteristics. Rather, these classifications
would themselves vary depending upon context. That is, the classifications would interact
with one another, and thereby be further delineated. For example, a particular security could
be deemed a "low risk" bearing instrument generally, but nevertheless "high risk" for a
particular category (or categories) of investor. Or, from the opposite angle, an investor could
be generally deemed to have a "high risk" level of tolerance, but that risk level drops to "low"
or "intolerant" when confronted with securities of a particular type or bearing particular
characteristics (related, perhaps, to an industry or some other factor that would be singularly
relevant to the investor classification in question).
Of course, not every possible interaction could be foreseen - and there are only so
many categories into which securities and investors could be placed. The SEC's guidelines
and matrix would not need to, nor purport to cover the entire field of potential securities
transactions. Rather, the SEC would attempt to cover most of the field and, moreover, cover
those transactions which the SEC believes most seriously need to be covered.
As ambitious as such an approach might initially seem, it does to a large extent build
upon existing regulatory infrastructure and practices. At its heart lies the well-established
suitability rules. The proposal essentially does little more than augment this privately
administered system for regulating risk with federal guidelines and definitions.
Further, the prospect of classifying investors and securities is not entirely new to the
SEC. For example, the SEC already classifies investors into certain categories, via its
"accredited investor," and "QIB" statuses.0 1 Of course, this is not as detailed a classification
as the one proposed above (nor as comprehensive). Further, the "accredited investor" and
"QIB" classifications are employed to ascertain the degree to which an investor may partake
in the sale of a non-registered security - they do not purport to accurately assess the degree to
101See

William K. Sjostrom Jr., The Birth Of Rule 144a Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 409, 443-44

(December 2008).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

13

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

which a particular investor can handle investment risk. Nevertheless, their use does
underscore the point that classifying investors is not alien to U.S. securities laws.
Additionally, an argument can be made that the SEC has already adopted a
securities classification scheme - albeit indirectly. For ever since the regulatory reforms of
2005, the SEC has classified issuers into the following four categories: "(1) the well-known
seasoned issuer, (2) the seasoned issuer, (3) the unseasoned Exchange Act reporting issuer,
and (4) the non-reporting issuer." 10 2 These issuer classifications are largely driven by the
degree to which a particular issue is publicly known and widely followed in the financial
markets. 103 Their purpose is to assess the amount of disclosure deemed necessary in such
issuer's public offering of securities. 10 4 Thus, the securities of some types of issuers (such as
"non-reporting issuers") will require greater disclosure in a public offering than the securities
of others types of issuers (such as "well-known seasoned issuers"). 105 This purpose differs
from the proposed classification schema proposed above, which is not to determine the
amount of disclosure necessary in a public offering, but rather to categorize the substantive
riskiness of the security as an investment. That said, the practice of categorizing issuers as
per the 2005 reforms furnishes a precedent pursuant to which the SEC has determined to treat
different securities differently.
Further still, U.S. securities laws have long recognized a distinction between
securities that are registered versus securities that are unregistered. 106 Depending upon where
a security falls within this dichotomy, the entire regulatory disclosure regime may or may not
1°7
apply to it.
Moreover, and more relevantly, their
classification in this regard even
108
determines which investors may purchase the security.
C.

The PotentialBenefits of Merit Regulation via the SuitabilityRules

The proposal set forth above would have the SEC play a substantial (if not a
leading) role in the assessment of suitability. The classification of both securities, and
investors, would be made in accordance with SEC guidelines. Even the ultimate question of
suitability would itself be governed by SEC rules, pursuant to which certain riskclassifications of securities would be deemed unsuitable (and thereby off-limits) to certain
categories of investors. Effectuating merit regulation via the suitability rules, as proposed
here, could offer significant benefits without the costs that usually accompany blue-sky-type
merit regulation.
The primary benefit is that, as already noted, such an approach would allow the
federal government and the SEC to bring its resources to bear upon the question of investment
risk. These resources include increased access to vital information under the provisions

See Joseph F. Morrissey, Rhetoric And Reality: Investor Protection And The Securities Regulation Reform
Of2005, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 561, 574 (Winter 2007).
102

103

See id.
id.
See id.
See Stephen J. Choi, A Framework For The Regulation Of Securities Market Intermediaries, I BERKELEY

104 See
105
106

Bus. L.J. 45, 79 (Spring 2004).
107 See id.
'0 See id.;
see also Sjostrom, supra note 101.
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contained in the Dodd-Frank Act.10 9 This information, in conjunction with the information
and analysis already publicly available via the work of research analysts and other industry
professionals, should yield a more accurate assessment and classification of the riskiness of
securities.
But unlike the typical approach taken by merit regulators at the state level, this
proposal would not be nearly as resource intensive - for at least two reasons. First, under this
proposal the SEC would be limiting itself to promulgating rules and standards for use in
assessing suitability - in terms of both security/issuer evaluation and investor classification.
This varies from the typical approach of merit regulation, pursuant to which the regulator
would pass judgment upon securities offerings on an offering-by-offering basis. Second, the
SEC would not even be applying its rules and standards governing suitability - securities
brokers would, thus passing on this cost to them.
An added benefit of this approach is the fine-tuning that it enables - another
departure from traditional merit regulation, which possesses a certain all-or-nothing quality.
That is, the SEC would not be designating certain securities offerings as simply "off limits" to
all investors, but rather would be effectively placing certain securities off limits to only
certain groups of investors (due to the interaction of the security's risk assessment under the
SEC's guidelines, and the investor's risk tolerance, also determined under SEC guidelines).
This also puts the SEC in a particularly good position to implement public policy regarding
both investor protection and issues of systemic risk.
Further fine-tuning would be possible if the SEC were to permit investors to petition
for exemption to the applicability of its suitability rules and standards on a case-by-case basis.
For example, although SEC standards might deem a particular security unsuitable for a
particular class of investor with a given classification, that investor could be permitted an
opportunity to explain why its situation does not call for application of the governing
standard.
A third improvement that the proposal features over traditional merit regulation is
that it reaches secondary market trading in addition to primary market offerings. The typical
merit regulator assesses the merits of a security at the time of its offering to the public.110
Once the security is trading in the marketplace, among investors, there is ordinarily little or no
further regulation of the security's merit.1 By contrast, the instant proposal would establish
rules, standards, and guidelines that would apply to every securities transaction involving a
broker. Thus, it would not only govern the transaction between an issuer an investor, but
would also ensure that trades between investors were suitable and consistent with public
policy.
CONCLUSION
The financial crisis of 2008 has caused many to revisit the merits of merit
regulation. The benefits of such an approach, in terms of more robust investor protection, and
another tool to address systemic risk, might be as appealing as ever. But so are the
approach's drawbacks, including its resource-intensiveness and the risk that certain offerings
109See Dodd-Frank, supra note 2; see also Lee, supranote 83.
110See Geyer, supra note 86, at 306.

m See id.
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might be locked out of the capital markets altogether on the basis of a regulator's judgment
(which could be erroneous or, worse, biased). Federal commandeering of the suitability rules,
along the lines outlined here, offer a means by which the benefits of merit regulation can be
largely obtained without many of the costs that the usual accompany such an approach.
Admittedly, much remains to be considered with this proposal, and many questions
remain unanswered. As drafted, the proposal only applies to broker's transactions in which
the suitability rules are implicated. As such, a large number of transactions, both of
individual investors and institutional investors, would not fall under its umbrella. To have its
intended effect, this proposal would need to be replicated as necessary to cover such
transactions as well.
Thus, as is readily apparent, this proposal is simply an opening foray. It represents
an effort to address a critical problem, and a problematic solution, by sketching a course of
action that is hopefully creative but not unrealistic, modest but not meaningless. My hope is
that to the extent it resonates, others will add flesh to its bones and build upon whatever
elements are deemed of value.
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